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Glossary 
AWAMI-League political party in Bangladesh 
Dinka   Dinkas represent the main ethnic group in southern Sudan 
Equatorian   Equatorians are a minority ethnic group in southern Sudan 
Indios   the indigenous Amerindian population in Mexico 
Jumma   tribal people in the Chittagong Hill Tracts 
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Nuer   Nuers constitute the second largest ethnic group in southern Sudan 
Shanti Bahini the armed wing of the JSS 
Shikomoro   official language in the Comoros 
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Abstract/Zusammenfassung/Résumé 
Power-sharing mechanisms play an increasingly important role in peace agreements. However, there is 
profound divergence over the positive effects of the inclusion of political power-sharing provisions in peace 
accords. Proposing power-sharing solutions may be useful for mediators to get conflict parties to the 
negotiating table. At the same time those mechanisms imply a number of challenges for academics and 
practitioners. Many critics argue that power-sharing as specific political model has only worked in particular 
circumstances, such as in Switzerland. Before formulating general guidelines and recommendations on power-
sharing in peace agreements, one has to address this critique. To this end the working paper analyses four 
contested favourable conditions in the power-sharing model: a small population size, a balance of population 
size between divided groups, territorial isolation of population groups and a common perceived security threat. 
Eight case studies are carried out in order to test these four favourable conditions that might influence the 
durability of power-sharing peace agreements. As a result, this working paper provides evidence that the 
durability of power-sharing peace agreements does probably not depend on these favourable conditions. It is 
therefore argued that power-sharing solutions in peace agreements do not seem to require particular 
favourable conditions to be successful and are not doomed to fail from the outset in a range of different 
contexts. 
Machtteilungsmechanismen spielen in Friedensverträgen eine zunehmend wichtige Rolle. Doch das Einbinden 
von politischen Machtteilungsinstitutionen in Friedensverhandlungen ist umstritten, da Uneinigkeit über deren 
positive Auswirkungen herrscht. Für Mediatoren kann das Zurückgreifen auf Machtteilungslösungen nützlich 
sein, um Konfliktparteien an den Verhandlungstisch zu bringen. Gleichzeitig stellt Machtteilung grosse 
Herausforderungen sowohl an Wissenschaft als auch Praxis. Viele Kritiker sehen darin lediglich ein politisches 
Modell, das nur unter ganz bestimmten Bedingungen funktioniert, so zum Beispiel in der Schweiz. Bevor 
generelle Leitsätze und Empfehlungen zur Berücksichtigung von Machtteilungsmechanismen in 
Friedensverträgen formuliert werden können, gilt es deshalb, zu klären, ob Machtteilung nur unter bestimmten 
Bedingungen funktionieren kann. Dieses Working Paper untersucht Bedingungen für funktionierende 
Machtteilungsmechanismen in Friedensverträgen und berücksichtigt dabei vier begünstigende Kontextfaktoren: 
kleine Bevölkerungszahl, Bevölkerungsgleichgewicht zwischen den verfeindeten Bevölkerungsgruppen, deren 
territoriale Abgrenzung sowie eine gemeinsam wahrgenommene Sicherheitsbedrohung. Anhand von acht 
Fallstudien wird der begünstigende Einfluss dieser vier Bedingungen auf die Dauerhaftigkeit von 
Friedenverträgen untersucht. Die Ergebnisse dieses Working Papers weisen darauf hin, dass die Dauerhaftigkeit 
von Friedensverträgen mit einer Machtteilungskomponente nicht von den vier untersuchten Bedingungen 
abhängig ist. Dies lässt den Schluss zu, dass Machtteilungslösungen in Friedensverträgen nicht auf besondere 
begünstigende Faktoren angewiesen sind, um erfolgreich zu sein, und sie deshalb in unterschiedlichen 
Kontexten nicht von vornherein zum Scheitern verurteilt sind. 
Les mécanismes de partage du pouvoir jouent un rôle de plus en plus important dans les accords de paix. 
Pourtant, les divergences sont profondes quant aux effets positifs de ces institutions de partage du pouvoir 
politique dans les accords de paix. Pour les médiateurs, esquisser une solution de partage du pouvoir peut être 
utile afin d’amener les parties au conflit à la table des négociations. En même temps, le recours à de tels 
mécanismes implique des défis importants pour le monde académique et pratique. De nombreuses voix 
critiques affirment que comme modèle politique il n’a que fonctionné dans des conditions particulières comme 
en Suisse par exemple. Avant de pouvoir formuler des recommandations et des principes directeurs sur le 
partage du pouvoir dans les accords de paix, il s’agit donc de se demander si cette critique est pertinente. Tel 
est le but de ce working paper qui considère quatre conditions favorables dans le modèle du partage du 
pouvoir: une population de taille limitée, l’équilibre entre la taille des groupes de population antagonistes, 
l’isolation territoriale de ceux-ci ainsi que la perception commune d’une menace de sécurité. Huit études de cas 
sont menées afin de tester ces quatre conditions favorables qui pourraient influencer la durabilité d’accords de 
paix comprenant des mécanismes de partage du pouvoir. Ce working paper fournit des indices que la durabilité 
de ce type d’accords de paix ne dépend probablement pas de ces conditions favorables. Pour cette raison, la 
conclusion est avancée que les solutions de partage du pouvoir ne semblent pas requérir des conditions 
favorables particulières pour être durables et ne sont donc pas condamnées a priori à l’échec dans différents 
contextes. 
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1 Introduction 
 
The power-sharing model is influential in the field of conflict management. Some scholars have 
argued that power-sharing has the potential to manage internal conflicts in deeply divided societies 
(Lijphart, 1975b; 2002; Sisk, 2003). Power-sharing peace agreements have recently emerged ‘as the 
West’s preferred instrument of peacemaking‘ (Tull & Mehler, 2005: 375) and are recommended by 
leading mediation organisations as a mediation outcome at least for a transitional period 
(Papagianni, 2007; 2008). Yet, those arrangements are contested. It is argued that power-sharing 
can only function in Western countries where this political system has been established over a long 
period of time such as in Switzerland. Therefore, it is important from a practical and academic point 
of view to answer the question: Do power-sharing peace agreements need particular favourable 
conditions to be successful? Only if empirical evidence rejects such favourable conditions can one 
then formulate practical guidelines about the best sequencing, implementation and type of power-
sharing mechanisms in mediation processes and peace agreements to be used in different contexts. 
For that purpose, this working paper considers conditions that may affect the durability of power-
sharing peace agreements. Hence, it contributes to the debate about whether power-sharing 
institutions depend on particular favourable conditions. It will be based on the most prominent 
consociational or power-sharing model (Lijphart, 1969; 1975a; 1977). In his model, Lijphart has 
established favourable conditions affecting the durability of power-sharing. Even if heavily criticised 
(Bogaards, 2000; Papparlardo, 1981; Van Schendelen, 1984), four recurrent conditions can be 
identified in Lijphart’s work (Bogaards, 1998). They are a small population size, a balance of 
population size between segmented groups, territorial isolation of segmented population groups and 
a common perceived security threat. There is no other empirical study that considers Lijphart’s four 
conditions and their effects on the durability of power-sharing peace agreements. This is a gap in the 
understanding of power-sharing and its practical application. The main question is therefore to what 
extent do Lijphart’s four favourable conditions affect the durability of power-sharing peace 
agreements and what do the findings imply for the applicability of power-sharing provisions in peace 
agreements in different contexts. 
After this introduction, chapter two briefly reviews the academic literature and practical guidelines 
on power-sharing in peace agreements, outlines the critiques of power-sharing institutions and 
presents Lijphart’s model including favourable conditions. Chapter three explains the case selection 
and the operationalisation, and analyses the conditions potentially influencing the durability of 
power-sharing peace agreements through eight case studies. Finally, chapter four discusses results 
and chapter five concludes with a summary of empirical findings and outlines practical implications. 
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2 Power-Sharing Institutions and Peace Agreements 
The purpose of this chapter is to briefly review the literature and practical guidelines on power-
sharing peace agreements in the context of internal armed conflicts as well as major critiques. Then, 
it considers Lijphart’s power-sharing model, giving a precise definition and considering conditions 
that may favour the durability of power-sharing peace agreements. 
2.1 Mediating Power-Sharing Peace Agreements 
Power-sharing has become particularly prominent both in academia and practice since the end of 
the Cold War. The increasing number of negotiated settlements to end internal armed conflicts has 
brought about a great interest in the power-sharing model. In particular sharing executive power 
between former belligerents potentially offers strong conflict resolution incentives. From Bosnia and 
Herzegovina to Sudan mediators have relied on power-sharing clauses in order to convince conflict 
parties to negotiate, reach an agreement and increase the acceptance of a peace settlement by 
warring parties (Sisk, 2003; Papagianni, 2007). Western states in particular are more and more 
promoting power-sharing solutions in peacemaking processes in the wake of increased international 
involvement to bring internal armed conflicts to a negotiated end (Sisk, 2003; Tull & Mehler, 2005). 
For this reason increasing attention has been paid to power-sharing in the academic world but also 
in regard to practical implications and recommendations as outlined below. 
As political arrangement in peace agreements, power-sharing institutions are particularly prominent 
in the academic literature. A peace negotiation process provides a context, which facilitates changes 
to political institutions in a deeply divided society. Power-sharing potentially makes peace 
settlements more stable and durable. Academic studies have shown the positive effect of political, 
territorial, economic and military power-sharing clauses in peace agreements on the durability of 
peace (Binningsbø, 2005; Bose, 2005; Byrne, 2001; Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003; Hoddie & Hartzell, 
2003), although political power-sharing as most common institution in peace agreements might not 
be sufficient (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003; Jarstad & Nilsson, 2008). Yet, there is still profound 
disagreement on which political arrangements are the best conflict management mechanisms 
(Horowitz, 2001; Mehler, 2009; Oberschall, 2007; Reilly, 2006; Sisk, 2003). Despite this fact, a 
number of experts and specialised organisations developed practical recommendations regarding the 
use of power-sharing in peace mediation and negotiations as one potential solution. The Centre for 
Humanitarian Dialogue (Papagianni, 2007; 2008) published for its Africa Mediators Retreat 2007 
and for the Oslo Forum 2008 brief policy and background papers dealing with the use of power-
sharing in peace negotiations. They recommend that mediators consider power-sharing agreements 
as an option, but only when the agreement ‘defines the expiration day of power-sharing 
arrangements (…) and guarantees during the transitional period the gradual expansion of political 
participation beyond the signatories of agreements‘ (Papagianni, 2007: 33). Other experts advise as 
well to negotiate power-sharing agreements for a limited interim phase so that they enable a 
broader, more inclusive constitution-making process (Töpperwien, 2010). International actors should 
at the same time stay engaged throughout this power-sharing transitional phase (Papagianni, 2008). 
Democracy represents a central pillar for peace in Western and international approaches to 
peacebuilding (Paris, 1997). Democratic systems however, especially during electoral periods which 
often come at the end of a peacemaking process, can also increase conflictual competition and 
sharpen divisions (Crocker & Hampson, 1996; Lijphart, 2004; Paris & Sisk, 2009).1 A United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) guide on conflict prevention proposes pre-election power-sharing 
pacts as solution to mitigate conflict-exacerbating elections (UNDP, 2009). In such post-conflict 
contexts,   power-sharing  solutions   have   indeed  a  major  strength   according  to  the   academic  
 
______________________ 
1   Although there is a debate about whether power-sharing institutions imply that democracy has to be sacrificed for peace 
(Mehler, 2009), this debate is not addressed in this paper because it would lead to far. 
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literature: it does not allow for the political isolation of a former warring party even in the context of 
democratic competition. Power-sharing aims to increase ‘the sense of security by maximising its [the 
segmented group’s] control of its own destiny’ (Lijphart, 1995: 856). This represents the conflict 
management potential of power-sharing politics in post-conflict settings. Experts have therefore 
developed specific mediation guidelines on wealth-sharing (Hayson & Kane, 2009) and federalism 
(Töpperwien, 2009), two very specific forms of power-sharing. Another major problem for stable 
peace is the security dilemma faced by combatants: demobilisation and giving territory back to the 
government is necessary in order to stabilise peace. Yet, such a move increases the rebels’ 
vulnerability to military defeat if conflict resumes. This fact hinders them to be credibly committed to 
peace (Sisk, 2001; 2003; Walter, 1999). For this reason the sequencing of mediation in general 
(Zartmann, 1995; Zartmann & de Soto, 2010) and of power-sharing institutions in particular are 
practically of central importance (Töpperwien, 2010). The mentioned security dilemma can be 
overcome through extensive political, territorial and military power-sharing (Hoddie & Hartzell, 
2005; Walter, 1999), because decisions are then consensus-based and can be blocked through 
mutual veto power (Papagianni, 2008). Rebels therefore often ask for a guaranteed institutional 
share of power because of the security dilemma (Rothchild, 2002; Walter, 1999). 
From a practical point of view, there are still quite few guidelines for mediators on how and when to 
use political power-sharing mechanisms, although power-sharing has widely been used in peace 
agreements. After addressing the academic arguments and guidelines supportive of power-sharing 
as conflict management model in peace processes, one has to address the critiques as well. The next 
section outlines the main critiques dealing with the unintentional message of power-sharing for 
other armed groups, the effects of power-sharing on the political space and on the divides in society, 
as well as the impracticability of a model supposedly doomed to fail. 
2.2 Contested Power-Sharing 
Power-sharing in conflict contexts is contested. A number of critiques have been formulated and are 
outlined below, including some solutions to address problems. Getting armed groups to the 
negotiating table is often only possible when rebel groups consider it feasible to obtain some shares 
of power through negotiations. At the same time, buying rebel groups in a mediation process 
through a potential share of power is problematic. Following a predictable logic due to the 
increasing number of examples of engaged armed groups in power-sharing peace negotiations, 
‘would-be leaders are induced to conquer power‘ through armed insurgency (Tull & Mehler, 2005: 
375). The multiplication of armed insurgency and militarised politics in order to get the ‘rents of 
violence‘ (Tull & Mehler, 2005: 391) can be the adverse consequences. One solution might be to 
raise the threshold for inclusion in negotiation processes based on the respect of international 
humanitarian law (Tull & Mehler, 2005). 
Once an agreement is reached, a power-sharing peace agreement will freeze the war-time balance 
of power between the armed parties, not allowing for the inclusion of political actors, which did not 
participate in the armed conflict and the negotiations (Sisk, 2003; Tull & Mehler, 2005). Therefore, 
mediators have to make sure that power-sharing is only transitional and will allow for the gradual 
inclusion of excluded groups (Papagianni, 2007; 2008; Rothchild, 2002; Sisk, 2003). Another 
contested alternative in order to avoid this risk would be the promotion of enlarged and inclusive 
representation at the negotiation table (Töpperwien, 2010). Moreover, ‘by freezing cleavages, a 
consociational regime may actually reinforce (…) the kind of conflict it is designed to solve’ (Dryzek, 
2005: 223). Indeed, the integration of the societal divides into the political system may lead to 
centrifugal ethno-nationalist political competition, which can sharpen identities and increase 
tensions (Horowitz, 2002a; Spears, 2002) without solving the underlying conflict (Mehler, 2009). 
Power-sharing restrains for example multi-ethnic or non-ethnic parties and is vulnerable to extremist 
political  spoilers  who  exert  pressure  on more  moderate group representatives (Horowitz, 2002b). 
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A potential solution would be to gradually open up the political space and institutions during a 
transitional phase, in particular to civil opposition groups and possibly to excluded armed groups, 
although elites in power will strongly resist such developments (Papagianni, 2008). 
Another critique is that power-sharing institutions will often end in deadlock, because they are 
vulnerable to competition within the government and to radical elites tempted to misuse their veto 
power to block decisions. This point is linked to the argument that power-sharing has been 
established as political model based on European examples (Lijphart, 2002a) and that it can only 
work in very few particular European countries where cleavages in society are less severe (Horowitz, 
2001; Spears, 2002). Some authors therefore have argued that it is a vague and normative theory of 
superior democracy (Bogaards, 2000; Lustick, 1997; Sartori, 1994, Van Schendelen, 1984). This 
working paper deals with this fundamental critique, because it directly relates to favourable 
conditions as will be shown later. In a post-conflict context, decisions by power-sharing 
governments will only reflect the minimal common denominator and may hinder effective post-war 
reconstruction and reconciliation processes (Papagianni, 2007). In particular, many contested issues 
will not be settled in the peace agreement and therefore have to be addressed within the power-
sharing institutions. Yet, continued commitment by international actors may help resolve some of 
the issues, such as disarmament and demobilisation, electoral laws or security sector reforms, even 
though elites may resist further external involvement (Papagianni, 2008). Power-sharing institutions 
can then act as ‘vehicle through which the parties continue talking and negotiating‘ (Papagianni, 
2008: 3) and create consensus-oriented elite behaviour (Lijphart, 2002a). Power-sharing institutions 
can be promoted by external actors to some extent, but in order to work they need to be 
pragmatically supported and not for tactical reasons by conflict parties (Sisk, 1996). 
In practical terms, the identification of the most suitable power-sharing mechanisms to avoid the 
pitfalls mentioned is important. But first following the aim of this working paper, it is essential to 
deal with the more fundamental critique and ask if power-sharing solutions in peace agreements 
may only work in the context of particular favourable conditions. If so, power-sharing peace 
agreements in conflict-affected countries are probably doomed to fail in most contexts. This relates 
to the critique as outlined above: as a specific European model power-sharing allegedly cannot work 
and is doomed to fail elsewhere. This question is of practical importance, because power-sharing is 
increasingly used in peace agreements in a wide range of contexts. 
2.3 Defining the Power-Sharing Model 
A number of authors (Lehmbruch, 1974; McRae, 1974), but in particular Arend Lijphart (1969; 
1975a; 1977; 1995; 1996; 1999; 2002b), have observed that some divided societies have established 
a stable democratic system through cooperative elite accommodation. This is called the 
consociational or power-sharing model. This working paper is based on Lijphart’s model, because his 
model is the most prominent one. Academic work (Binningsbø, 2005; Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003; Sisk, 
1996) and practical publications (Papagianni, 2007) all refer to Lijphart’s work. Lijphart is so 
overwhelmingly prominent in the power-sharing debate that he has been called ‘Mr Power-sharing’ 
(Lijphart, 2002a). Critiques in particular are directly addressed to Lijphart’s model (Bogaards, 2000; 
Horowitz, 2001). Conceptually it therefore makes most sense to rely on Lijphart’s model in this 
working paper as well, despite the fact that models should never be applied one-to-one in practice. 
The model is based on empirical evidence from the Netherlands until 1967 (Lijphart, 1975a), 
Switzerland, Belgium (Lehmbruch, 1974; Lijphart, 1975a; McRae, 1997) or South Tirol (Markusse, 
1997). Power-sharing institutions can be described as ‘government by elite cartel designed to turn a 
democracy (…) into a stable democracy’ (Lijphart, 1969: 216) in the context of religious, linguistic, 
ideological, political, cultural or ethnic cleavages which underlie perceived group distinctiveness 
(Lijphart, 1977). These identities are particularly salient during and after armed conflicts. Lijphart 
(1969; 1975a; 1977; 1996) proposes a number of defining characteristics in order to qualify for a 
power-sharing political system. In  his most recent publications Lijphart has defined power-sharing in  
Peace With Power-Sharing: Under Which Conditions? 
10 
 
terms of two primary characteristics:2 executive power-sharing and segmental group autonomy 
(Lijphart, 2002a: 2004).3 These two characteristics are rather broad and can practically take a 
number of different forms. 
Executive power-sharing is the guaranteed inclusion of representatives from the different divided 
groups in society in the executive decision-making process (Lijphart, 2004). This can for example 
take the form of quotas within the government or the repartition of functions such as president and 
prime minister between various groups (Lijphart, 1995). Segmental group autonomy, the second 
characteristic, is the ‘rule by the minority over itself in the area of the minority’s exclusive concern’ 
(Lijphart, 1977: 41). Group autonomy is widely recognised as an essential part of accommodative 
arrangements (Ghai, 2002; Hartzell et al, 2001; Horowitz, 2001; Sisk, 1998). It can take the form of 
territorial federalism, territorial autonomy or even non-territorial autonomy such as legislative power 
regarding religion, culture and education for a segmented group (Lijphart, 1995). 
The presented power-sharing model has been established in the context of political parties sharing 
power in a European context. Using this model in conflict and peacebuilding contexts to share power 
between armed groups and governments therefore implies difficulties. This could be an explanation 
for the contested nature of power-sharing in peace settlements. On the other hand, power-sharing in 
conflict contexts is a trend and reality that has to be acknowledged. In order to better understand 
how it may work, making the link from the academic model to practice is necessary. Due to the 
conceptual centrality of Lijphart’s political model, it is important to apply and test Lijphart’s model in 
the particular context of peace agreements and thus to link the political model to international 
practice in conflict situations. This does not mean that an academic model, which is mainly an 
analytical tool, should be applied as such in practice without adaptation to the local reality. 
2.4 Favourable Conditions 
Following the aforementioned critique that power-sharing can only emerge and function in 
particular circumstances such as in the Netherlands until 1967 or Switzerland, Lijphart tried to 
identify favourable structural conditions for the power-sharing model. Those conditions may lead to 
‘overarching elite cooperation and stable non-elite support’ (Lijphart, 1977: 54), although they are 
probably not sufficient to establish and maintain power-sharing institutions according to Lijphart 
(1977). Therefore, other scholars (Papparlardo, 1981; Van Schendelen, 1984) have rejected Lijphart’s 
favourable conditions. The tension between the voluntaristic approach of power-sharing based on 
the free will of elites and the deterministic favourable conditions has been criticised (Bogaards, 
1998). This heuristic debate between determinism and voluntarism cannot be resolved here. Yet, this 
working paper is able to make a contribution to the debate about conditions by empirically testing 
favourable conditions in the context of power-sharing peace agreements. In the context of an armed 
conflict, a peace agreement is not just a decision to change political institutions and adopt new 
ones, but to abandon armed struggle for power-sharing. This dramatic shift can hardly be explained 
by context factors alone and implies a voluntaristic approach to institutions. However, once a power-
sharing peace agreement is signed, favourable conditions might be increasingly important to 
maintain and ensure the durability of those institutions over time (Schneckener, 2002). Therefore, 
favourable conditions are used as analytical tool to try to understand where power-sharing 
agreements may potentially work. 
 
______________________ 
2   These two defining characteristics correspond to horizontal and vertical power-sharing as developed in management 
theory (Drake & Mitchell, 1977). 
3   Lijphart only mentions proportional representation as secondary characteristic (Lijphart, 2002b). Proportionality which is 
sometimes part of the definition (Papagianni, 2007) will therefore not be taken into account, especially because this 
specific electoral feature is almost never explicitly mentioned in peace agreements and may already pre-exist in a country 
affected by armed conflict. 
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A large number of favourable conditions have been proposed in the literature including systemic, 
country, divided group and elite characteristics (Lehmbruch, 1975; Papparlardo, 1981; Bogaards, 
1998; Sisk, 2001; Schneckener, 2002). Theoretical coherence is often lacking in the selection of 
conditions. Lijphart’s (1969; 1975a; 1977) own conditions have been changing over time. This is a 
problematic theoretical background. However, Bogaards (1998) has identified four recurrent mainly 
structural favourable conditions in Lijphart’s work: a small population size, the balance of population 
size between segmented groups, territorial isolation of segmented groups and a common perceived 
security threat. 
A small population size is the first condition. The most important argument about the favourable 
character of a small population size is that it implies less policy issues and political burden faced by 
a country. Hence, accommodation is easier (Lehmbruch, 1975; Lijphart, 1975a; 1977). It is also 
stated in the literature that small countries face less conflicts (Collier & Hoeffler, 2002). 
The balance of population size between segmented groups is the second condition. A multiple 
balance between more than two segmented population groups is favourable, because if only two 
segmented groups exist, the majority group might prefer to dominate the minority group through 
majority rule, whereas a multiple balance forces groups to cooperate (Lijphart, 1969; Lehmbruch, 
1975). Hence, it is important not to have a clear majority group in the population and a rough 
equilibrium between groups regarding size (Lijphart, 1977; Schneckener, 2002). Too many 
segmented population groups are unfavourable as well, since cooperation would be extremely 
difficult between more than four groups (Lijphart, 1977). 
Territorial isolation of segmented population groups is the third condition. Power-sharing is 
favoured in divided societies with clear geographical segmental lines. The intermingling of 
segmented groups is more conducive to conflict, since isolation limits the potential for hostility to 
transform into actual conflict (Lijphart, 1969; 1975a). It also has a favourable character because it 
facilitates executive power-sharing and group autonomy on a geographical basis (Schneckener, 
2002). 
A common security threat is the fourth condition. The political willingness to cooperate is 
facilitated by a common security threat. Yet, it should be perceived as a threat by all segmented 
groups (Lijphart, 1977; McRae, 1997). If segmented groups are supported by different external rival 
powers for example, an external threat will certainly not favour the durability of power-sharing 
(Lehmbruch, 1975). 
This paper will only test the influence of those four favourable conditions on the durability of power-
sharing peace agreements, since there has been no coherent attempt in the literature to test the four 
mentioned favourable conditions in the particular context of peace agreements. The context 
differences in terms of economic development or political environment is certainly huge between 
stable European societies and those emerging from conflict. Yet, the aim of the working paper is to 
deal in particular with the critique arguing that power-sharing can only work in a favourable 
European context. Thus, one has to apply the four favourable conditions identified in the model 
based on European examples to peace agreement contexts as analytical starting point. If such 
favourable conditions are confirmed by empirical evidence from power-sharing peace agreement 
case studies, power-sharing provisions should probably not be used in peace agreements in a variety 
of contexts, since power-sharing would in that case only be successful in a very particular favourable 
context as claimed by critics. These four conditions therefore directly relate to the research aim of 
this working paper. Yet, I do not claim that those four conditions are the only one relevant in conflict 
situations as will be shown. 
 
 
Peace With Power-Sharing: Under Which Conditions? 
12 
 
One has to bear in mind that many variables influence the durability of peace agreements in general 
(Stedman, 2002). These variables include context factors such as the international system (Hartzell et 
al, 2001) or the level of development (Doyle & Sambanis, 2000), as well as conflict characteristics 
such as the type of conflict, duration and intensity (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003; Gleditsch et al, 2002).  
In addition, the political context including the involvement of a third party (Walter, 1997; 1999), the 
United Nations (Doyle & Sambanis, 2000) or the existence of spoilers (Stedman, 1997) are seen as 
important. Finally, variables also include the terms of settlement regarding disarmament and 
demobilisation (Spears, 2002; Walter, 1999) and the extent of actual implementation of the 
agreement (Hoddie & Hartzell, 2005). Those factors are likely to affect all peace settlements, not 
only the one providing for power-sharing institutions (Papagianni, 2007). The broad range of 
variables implies that a systematic evaluation is very difficult and beyond the scope of this working 
paper. At the same time, some of these context factors may be particularly important for power-
sharing peace agreements. Therefore, beyond testing Lijphart’s four favourable conditions, the case 
studies will also be used in this paper to identify potential context factors among those identified in 
the literature which may be of particular relevance in regard to the durability of power-sharing peace 
agreements and which practitioners should pay attention to. 
In the next chapter, the case selection is outlined. Variables are then operationalised and the four 
conditions potentially favouring the durability of power-sharing peace agreements tested on the 
sample of peace agreement cases. 
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3 Eight Case Studies 
This chapter outlines the adopted case selection strategy and the operationalisation of variables for 
testing the four favourable conditions. In the second part the eight case studies are carried out. 
3.1 Case Selection 
The unit of analysis for this paper is the peace agreement. The population of all agreements included 
in the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme (UCDP)4 at Uppsala University will be used. The UCDP 
recently compiled a specific dataset (version 1.0) on peace agreements,5 covering the period from 
1989 to 2005 (Harbom et al, 2006). The dataset has recorded 146 peace agreements between 1989 
and 2005 in 44 different internal armed conflicts. Peace agreements of this dataset signed between 
at least two conflict parties are selected if they contain the two defining characteristics of Lijphart’s 
power-sharing model. For the two defining characteristics UCDP database variables6 are used which 
match closely the definition adopted in this paper. First, the UCDP variable power-sharing in the 
government or the variable local power-sharing for peace agreements affecting institutions at the 
local level are used to operationalise executive power-sharing as first characteristic. Secondly, the 
UCDP variables autonomy or federalism are used to operationalise group autonomy as the second 
characteristic of Liphart’s definition. Only the following eight agreements provide for the two 
defining power-sharing features: 
 
Table of power-sharing peace agreement cases 
Peace agreement Date Country/Region 
Bodoland Autonomous Council agreement 1993 Bodoland (India) 
Washington agreement 1994 Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
Dayton peace agreement 1995 Bosnia-Herzegovina 
San Andrés agreement 1996 Chiapas (Mexico) 
Chittagong Hill Tracts agreement 1997 Chittagong Hill Tracts (Bangladesh) 
 
 
______________________ 
4   The UCDP database is widely used mostly in European academia. The academic database on civil wars mostly used in the 
United States is the Correlate of War Project. It records all civil wars reaching a threshold of a 1,000 battle-related deaths 
a year or in total. This threshold excludes well-known conflicts such as the one in the Basque Country. The UCDP database 
used here uses a lower threshold for the definition of an armed conflict: ‘a contested incompatibility that concerns 
government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government 
of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year’ (Gleditsch et al, 2002: 3). Although this low 
threshold may be criticised, it is more interesting to include cases of low intensity conflict to allow for a greater variation 
of cases. 
5   A peace agreement is defined as an arrangement concerning, managing or regulating ‘the problem of the incompatibility 
[cause of conflict], either by settling all or part of it, or by clearly outlining a process for how the warring parties plan to 
regulate the incompatibility’ (Högbladh, 2006: 3). Such a definition is largely accepted (Downs & Stedman, 2002). 
6   For the exact codification rules for those variables see Högbladh (2006) and Harbom et al (2006). 
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Khartoum agreement 1997 Sudan 
Framework agreement 2003 Comoros 
Comprehensive peace agreement 2005 Sudan7 
 
As a result, this paper will take into consideration all eight8 power-sharing peace agreements even 
though some have been signed in the same country. The diversity of the cases in terms of 
geographical variation allows gathering empirical evidence in regard to the research question and 
practical implications. This sample of cases has mostly not been considered by Lijphart himself or 
other authors. 
3.2 Operationalisation of Variables 
The different variables and in particular the four favourable conditions are operationalised in order 
to analyse cases consistently. They are based on Lijphart’s ideas even though some adaptations are 
necessary to fit the armed conflict context. 
First, one has to define the durability of a peace agreement as the outcome variable. In the 
literature, some define a one-year period for durability (Binningsbø, 2005) or a five-year period 
(Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003; Hartzell et al, 2001) during which no armed violence occurs between the 
signatories and during which the agreement is not ended by one side. Given the difficult short-term 
implementation of a peace agreement and because very few conflicts have re-emerged after five 
peaceful years (Hartzell et al, 2001; Jarstad & Nilsson, 2008), I opt for the longer five-year period as 
a measure for durability. It is measured through the UCDP variable violence with the same parties 
restarted within 5 years and the UCDP variable agreement ended by parties. 
Regarding the following four operationalised favourable conditions, data and information used are 
as close as possible to the date of signature of the case agreement, although the scarcity of data is a 
limitation to this endeavour. The outlined operationalisations apply to a country or a region 
depending on the geographical scope of the power-sharing peace agreement. Favourable conditions 
are operationalised as follows. 
For population size, the categories used in the case studies are small or big. Even though this factor 
is often used in the literature for statistical analyses, small or big population categories are not 
defined (Collier & Hoeffler, 2002; 2004; Hegre & Raleigh, 2007) and other measures such as 
population density are also considered. In this paper I follow Lijphart´s approach (1975b; 1977), who 
used  thresholds  to  qualify  countries  based  on  European  examples.  Since  the  case  studies  are  
 
______________________ 
7   In fact two more agreements provide for the two defining characteristics: the Protocol on power-sharing in Sudan in 2004 
and the Protocol on Kordofan and Blue Nile States in Sudan in 2004. Both protocols were part of the official negotiation 
process that led to the Comprehensive peace agreement in 2005. As such they cannot be considered as separate case 
studies. 
8   One may wonder why the 1998 Good Friday peace agreement in Northern Ireland is not a case study. It is commonly 
acknowledged as a power-sharing accord (Byrne, 2001; Horowitz, 2002b; Lijphart, 2002a). The reason is a definitional 
problem. The UCDP adopted a narrow definition of executive power-sharing privileging reliability over validity: an 
agreement should establish percentages or numbers of representation for divided groups. The Belfast agreement has no 
such formalised executive power-sharing provision, even though in reality the Belfast agreement led to power-sharing 
governments in Northern Ireland. The Good Friday case is not included in the case study research, since the paper relies 
on the UCDP database. 
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scattered around the world, I opt for the threshold of the median population size of all countries in 
the world, which is 5.4 million in 2009 (Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2009). The 
median is a reasonable measure for central tendency (Geddes, 2003) and is therefore appropriate for 
a threshold value. Moreover, due to the clear repartition of cases some problems linked with 
thresholds can be avoided in this working paper. Out of the six countries or regions for which the 
eight power-sharing peace agreements have been signed, only Sudan has a population of about 39 
million clearly to be considered as big. Bosnia-Herzegovina as the second largest country studied has 
only a population of about four million which is clearly below the median population size for all 
countries in the world. Therefore, one can reasonably classify all case studies as big or small 
countries or regions. Sources for population figures include the World Factbook (CIA, 2010), 
governmental websites and academic work. Yet, one has to keep in mind that census figures in a 
conflict context are highly politicised and often contested. 
Regarding the balance of population size between segmented groups, one has first to define 
segmented groups. In many countries the very complex, for example, ethnic divisions do not 
correspond to the fault lines in conflict. Thus, segmented population groups are considered if they 
are part of the armed conflict. For example a segmented group is not a rebel movement, but the 
population group it claims to represent. The demographic size of the relevant segmented groups is 
calculated based on the same sources as for the population size. A balance of population size 
between segmented groups exists if there is no majority group over 50 percent (Collier & Hoeffler, 
2002; 2004; Lijphart, 1977) and when three or four segmented groups exist (Lijphart, 1977).9 This 
definition corresponds to the one widely used in the literature (Boogards, 1998; Lijphart, 1977; 
Schneckener, 2002). 
Territorial isolation of the segmented population groups implies the geographical concentration of 
the relevant population groups (Lijphart, 1969). Therefore, it can be operationalised by considering a 
territorial fragmentation/homogeneity indicator (Lijphart, 1977). Demographic group figures for the 
administrative subdivisions are compared to national or regional figures depending on the scope of 
the power-sharing peace agreement. If segmental homogeneity is significantly higher at the regional 
than at the national level or at the local than at the regional level, one can conclude that the 
segmented population groups are territorially isolated (Lijphart, 1975; 1977). This is particularly true 
when the different segmented population groups form clear majorities in different administrative 
subdivisions. Accurate subnational demographic figures are not easily available for conflict-affected 
countries. However, estimates based on the academic literature and official figures enable to draw 
conclusions on how segmented population groups are distributed in different administrative 
subdivisions for the eight cases under consideration in the six countries/regions. 
Finally, regarding a security threat it is clear that a threat can only be a favourable condition if all 
relevant segmented population groups perceive it as a common threat (McRae, 1997). The 
operationalisation is based on the speech act security framework proposed by Buzan et al (1997). It 
states that security is a subjective discursive product. An issue is a security threat when it is 
presented and perceived as such. Therefore, a common perceived security threat exists when all 
relevant population groups often represented by a political or military movement present or describe 
in their discourse or published documents a threat as jeopardising the segmented population group’s 
security. This operationalisation is mostly based on information in the academic literature and allows 
analysing whether a threat is subjectively perceived as such. 
 
______________________ 
9   The Ethnic Fractionalisation Country Index (Posner, 2004) cannot be used neither for the balance of population size nor 
the territorial isolation of segmented groups, since many case agreements only relate to a region and not to a country. 
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Following the proposed operationalisation of the four favourable conditions, this paper considers the 
eight selected power-sharing peace agreements. First, the agreement in Bodoland, then the two 
agreements in Bosnia-Herzegovina, one in Chiapas, one in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, one in the 
Comoros and finally the two agreements in Sudan are analysed. The case studies briefly analyse the 
armed conflict and the peace process, determine the outcome variable and whether the favourable 
conditions are fulfilled or not. 
3.3 Bodoland Conflict, Assam (India) 
Bodo generically designates the Boro-Kachari tribal people inhabiting the plains on the northern 
shores of the Brahmaputra river in the west of the Indian state of Assam (Dasgupta, 1997).10 The 
Bodo tribes have felt discriminated and aggrieved by the Assamese state, as well as threatened by 
Muslim Bengali and tea-tribe11 migrants. Large parts of Bodo land was alienated and the Bodo 
people did not enjoy the same protection and autonomy as granted to other tribes by the Indian 
constitution (George, 1994; Bhaumik, 2000). 
Following the example of other successful tribal insurgencies in Assam, the All Bodo Student Union 
(ABSU) took up the Bodo cause, asking for autonomy (Chadha, 2005). Violent agitation started in 
1987, escalating rapidly into insurgency against the Assamese state, but also targeting migrant 
communities (George, 1994). In February 1993, the ABSU and the Bodo People’s Action Committee 
signed a memorandum of understanding with the government of Assam (Bodoland Territorial 
Council, 2007). This accord is the first case. It creates the power-sharing Bodoland Autonomous 
Council (BAC) composed of a General Council with 35 elected members and five government-
nominated members from groups not otherwise represented and an Executive Council. At the same 
time, it provides for tribal courts and local autonomy (Bodoland Territorial Council, 2007). According 
to the UCDP (Harbom et al, 2006), this peace agreement has not been ended even though 
temporarily delayed and no violence has resurged within five years between the same conflict 
parties. Thus, the agreement has been durable. Yet, in the years 1996 to 1998, the National 
Democratic Front of Bodoland, not party to the agreement, as well as the newly created Bodoland 
Liberation Tiger Forces continued the armed struggle for full independence (Dasgupta, 1997; 
Bhaumik, 2000). This short overview leads to the analysis of the four favourable conditions in 
Bodoland. 
3.3.1 Favourable Conditions in Bodoland 
One of the problems in assessing the conditions in Bodoland is that the peace accord does not 
clearly define the BAC territory. Bodo movements claimed a large Bodo homeland. Yet, the 
government unilaterally decided that the BAC area would encompass 2750 villages with a 
population of 2.14 millions (George, 1994; Chadha, 2005). Even if this figure is problematic, the 
region clearly has a small population size, as defined in the selected operationalisation. 
Regarding the balance of population size between segmented groups, the accord stipulates that all 
villages with at least 50 percent Bodo population would be included in the BAC. However, 
eventually the BAC comprises 38 percent of Bodo population, because many non-Bodo villages have 
been included in the BAC in order to create a contiguous entity (Chadha, 2005). In particular, the 
inclusion of tea plantations implies that tea-tribes, but also Bengali immigrants and Assamese form 
a large part of the BAC population (Dasgupta, 1997; Shimray, 2006). Exact figures cannot be 
provided for the operationalisation. However, Bengali and Assamese are traditionally in conflict in 
Assam,  and  the  tea-tribes  have  started  to  resist  collectively  creating  armed  resistance   groups  
 
______________________ 
10  Refer to the map in appendix 1. 
11  This name refers to tribal groups brought to Assam to work on tea plantations (Bhaumik, 2000). 
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(Bhaumik, 2000). Thus, one can conclude that there are at least three, probably four segmented 
groups relevant to the conflict. The largest group, the Bodos, only represents 38 percent of the 
population. This logically implies that the condition of balance of population size as defined above is 
fulfilled, even though Bodos are exercising much of the power (Dasgupta, 1997). 
Regarding the segmental territorial isolation of population groups, Bodos form a majority in 1100 
villages out of 2750 under the BAC authority (Chadha, 2005). There are no precise statistics for the 
BAC region, because it partially covers the seven districts of Dhubri, Kokrajhar, Bongaigaon, Barpeta, 
Nalbari, Kamrup and Darrang12 (George, 1994). However, proxy estimates of territorial distribution 
of the Bodos exist. The four Assamese districts created in the Bodo region in 2003 cover 
approximately the BAC territory (Chadha, 2005). The Chirang district in the former northern 
Bongaigaon district has about 49 percent tribal Bodos, the Baksa district in northern Barpeta, 
Nalbari and Kamrup 47 percent, Udalguri in northern Darrang 47 percent and only northern 
Kokrajhar has a 58 percent majority of Bodo people (Bodoland Territorial Council, 2006). Even 
though these are only proxy figures, one can argue that Bodos are not geographically isolated in the 
BAC, since there is no significant percental difference between the regions within the BAC. Indeed, 
this is a logical implication of the fact that non-majoritarian Bodo villages have been included in 
order to create a contiguous region. Hence, one has to conclude that no segmental territorial 
isolation exists. 
Finally, a potential common security threat has to be considered. Bodo and Assamese nationalist 
movements cooperated in the 1970s and 1980s against the common perceived threat of Bengali 
immigration (Dasgupta, 1997). However, more recently, the government of Assam and Assamese 
people have tried to ‘arbitrarily cleanse Assam of its genuinely original and authentic inhabitants’ 
according to Bodo insurgents (Dasgupta, 1997: 357). Hence, the Assamese government’s policies of 
‘Assamisation’, but also Bengali and tea-tribe migrants are seen as the major threats to the 
economic and cultural survival of Bodos (Dasgupta, 1997). On the other hand, Bodo groups have co-
operated with other insurgent groups in the region and received some support from New Delhi in 
order to destabilise the government of Assam (Bhaumik, 2000). Since the territory of Assam has 
already been significantly reduced by the creation of independent tribal states within the Union of 
India, the Bodo insurgency is considered as another serious tribal threat to the unity of Assam 
(George, 1994). Hence, at the time the peace agreement was signed, no common perceived threat 
existed anymore. 
This analysis will be used to compile a summarising table in chapter four after the completion of the 
other case studies. This peace agreement between the two conflict parties has been durable. It fulfils 
two favourable conditions out of four: a small population size and a balance of population size 
between segmented groups. 
3.4 Conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
This case study deals with the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina between 1992 and 1995. In the 
context of the dissolution of Yugoslavia, wars broke out in Slovenia and Croatia (Malcolm, 1996). 
The Bosnian government only had the choice to remain in a Serbian-dominated Yugoslavia or to 
declare independence (Rogel, 1998). At the same time, the Serb regions in northern and eastern 
Bosnia-Herzegovina were arming up with the support of the federal Yugoslav army and demanding 
secession (Malcolm, 1996). After the acceptance of the independence referendum and despite 
international  mediation,  Bosnia  faced  civil  war  in  spring  1992  (Kumar,  1997). The autonomous  
 
______________________ 
12  The tribal figures (Shimray, 2006) for those districts would not be useful, because the districts are by far larger than the 
BAC. See also map in appendix 1. 
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Republika Srpska supported by Yugoslavia was fighting against Bosnian troops and Croatian 
paramilitaries (Malcolm, 1996). At an early stage, Serb paramilitary forces conquered up to 60 
percent of Bosnia, expelling Bosniak Muslim13 and Croat populations, setting up camps and starting 
ethnic cleansing (Rogel, 1998). The war continued throughout 1993 and 1994. The United Nations 
(UN), the United States and European countries were reluctant to act (Malcolm, 1996). In 1993, the 
Vance-Owen peace plan was presented, proposing autonomous ‘ethnicised’ cantons in Bosnia. This 
peace plan was signed by the warring parties, but later rejected by the Bosnian Serb parliament. As 
a result, competition for territorial conquest increased, triggering heavy fighting between Bosniaks 
and Croats as well (Rogel, 1998; Kumar, 1997). 
In March 1994, the Washington agreement was signed by Bosniak and Croat representatives. It 
creates a Bosniak-Croat Federation of autonomous cantons within Bosnia-Herzegovina and a 
corresponding regional power-sharing government with an alternating presidency, preserving the 
integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina (UCDP, 1994). This accord is one of the case agreements. It allowed 
a common military effort against the Bosnian Serbs (Kumar, 1997). In 1994, new peace negotiations 
based on a division of Bosnia into the Federation and a Serb entity took place, but stalled (Malcolm, 
1996). Yet, after the military victory of the Croatian army against the Serb autonomous regions in 
Croatia in 1995 and the beginning of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) bombardments, the 
Bosnian Serb troops were under increasing military pressure (Rogel, 1998). At this stage, mediator 
Holbrooke pressured Croatia not to push for a full military victory in Bosnia. Finally, negotiations 
between Croatia, Bosnia and Serbia, representing the different segmented groups in Bosnia, took 
place. After a ceasefire in October, negotiations were finalised in Dayton and led to the signing of 
the General Peace Agreement in Paris in December 1995 (Malcolm, 1996). This is the second case 
agreement in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This agreement provides for the maintenance of the two 
autonomous entities of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska in a 
sovereign Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.14 Extensive regional autonomy encompasses internal 
security. The central power-sharing government and a tripartite presidency – composed of one 
Bosnian Croat, one Bosniak and one Bosnian Serb representative – only have competences in regard 
to foreign policy, trade, immigration and customs. One third of the parliament seats are reserved for 
each national group, with the possibility to declare an issue destructive of vital interests, requiring a 
majority vote from each group (OHR, 2010; Chandler, 2000). 
Authors have argued that Bosnia was condemned to renewed violence and partition (Malcolm, 
1996). Yet, mainly because of massive international presence of the UN, NATO, the European Union 
(EU) and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the conflict has not flared 
up (Bose, 2005; Chandler, 2000). Data from the UCDP (Harbom et al, 2006) confirms that the 
Washington and the Dayton agreements have not been ended, nor has violence resurged within five 
years. Both agreements are therefore durable. This brief presentation of the conflict and the peace 
agreements under consideration leads to the analysis of the four favourable conditions. 
 
 
 
 
______________________ 
13  In Yugoslavia, ‘Muslim’ was a nationality. However, this group is commonly named Bosniak, whereas Bosnian designates 
all citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Rogel, 1998). 
14  See map appendix 2. 
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3.4.1 Favourable Conditions in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
It is important to differentiate the two agreements under consideration. The Washington agreement 
only affects the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina mainly inhabited by Bosniaks and Croats, whereas 
the Dayton peace agreement deals with the whole country.15 Hence, conditions are analysed for both 
accords separately. 
Regarding population size, pre-war data shows that Bosnia-Herzegovina had 4.35 million 
inhabitants, but the impact of war in terms of civilian casualties and refugees has lowered the 
population size to an estimated 3.5 to 3.7 million (Rogel, 1998; UN Development Programme, 2002). 
This applies to the Dayton agreement. The region of the Federation had 2.7 million inhabitants 
before the war (Federal Statistics Office, 2008) and about 2.4 after the war (Kumar, 1997). Hence, 
for both cases, the population size is small. 
The balance of population size between segmented groups is a sensitive issue in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Even though the interpretation of ‘ancient ethnic hatreds as the origin of the conflict’ 
(Malcolm, 1996: 270) has been rejected, propaganda and war have segmented the population 
(Bose, 2005; Rogel, 1998). For the three relevant groups in the conflict, the 1991 census indicates 
that the population was composed of 43.7 percent Muslims/Bosniaks, 31.4 percent Serbs and 17.3 
percent Croats (Federal Statistics Office, 2008). After the war, the estimated repartition among 
segmented groups was 48.3 percent Bosniaks, 34 percent Serbs and 15.4 percent Croats (UN 
Development Programme, 2002). These figures are approximately confirmed in the 2000 census 
(CIA, 2008). Thus, the figures imply that no group has a majority and that the two smaller minority 
groups are able to outvote the largest group (Schneckener, 2002; Chandler, 2000). Hence, a balance 
of population size between the three groups exists in Bosnia. This applies to the Dayton agreement. 
In the Federation, pre-war figures show 52.3 percent of Muslim, 21.9 percent of Croat and 17.6 
percent of Serb population (Federal Statistics Office, 2008). However, after massive population 
displacements during the war, the ethnic composition changed. In a very controversial 1996 
unofficial census confirming ethnic cleansing, the office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) counted 72.5 percent Bosniaks, 22.8 percent Croats and 2.3 percent Serbs in the 
Federation. Even though recently return of minority population has occurred, these figures have 
probably not changed significantly (Bose, 2005). One can cautiously conclude that there is one 
dominant majority group in the Federation (Belloni, 2004). Hence, there is no segmental balance of 
population size for the Washington agreement. 
The territorial isolation of segmented population groups in Bosnia is difficult to assess. Even though 
during pre-war time, ethnic patterns were complex and no contiguity existed, ethnic cleansing and 
displacements during the war have created a more homogenous ethnic repartition, especially in the 
Republika Srpska (Malcolm, 1996; Chandler, 2000). In the unofficial 1996 UNHCR census, the 
territorial isolation was such that 98 percent of the population in the Republika Srpska was Serb 
(Kumar, 1997), even though up to 150,000 Bosniaks have returned in recent years (Bose, 2005). In 
the Federation, cantons have been purposefully drawn to create clear Croat and Bosniak majorities, 
except in Mostar (Malcolm, 1996).16 Indeed, most Croat districts have a clear Croat majority 
population of over 75 percent; the same applies to Bosniak districts (Kumar, 1997). Therefore, 
dominant group figures are regionally significantly higher than at the national level. Within the 
Federation, figures also indicate territorial isolation of Croats and Bosniaks. Hence, segmented 
groups are territorially rather isolated in Bosnia-Herzegovina and within the Federation. Both Dayton 
and Washington agreements fulfil this condition. 
 
______________________ 
15  See map appendix 2. 
16  See map appendix 2. 
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Regarding a common security threat, Bosnia is interesting. At the Federation level, Croats and 
Bosniaks feared each other to a certain point. Yet, the common perceived threat of Serb nationalism 
and aggression brought Croats and Bosniaks together against an imminent Serb threat in 1992 at 
the start of the war and again in 1994 when the Washington agreement was signed even though 
fightings broke out between these conflict parties in-between (Malcolm, 1996; Kumar, 1997). Hence, 
one can conclude that a common perceived threat existed when the Washington agreement was 
signed. 
This does not apply to the Dayton agreement. During the civil war, the Serb propaganda depicted 
the Croats as ‘Ustasha hordes’ (Malcolm, 1996: 217) in reference to the fascist Croatian regime 
during World War Two (Rogel, 1998). At the same time, the Muslims were presented as Islamist 
fundamentalists who would outbreed Bosnian Serbs (Slack & Doyon, 2001). The propaganda proved 
effective, since Serb population in Bosnia has been convinced of the Croat and Muslim threats 
(Malcolm, 1996). For the Croat population, Serb nationalism and expansionism was considered as 
the major threat. On the other hand, Bosniaks feared both Serb and Croat nationalism, but mostly 
Serb expansionism (Rogel, 1998; Bose, 2005). Thus, for the Dayton agreement, it is certainly not 
possible to speak of a common threat perceived by all three relevant groups. 
The Washington and Dayton agreements have been durable. The Washington agreement fulfils the 
favourable conditions of a small population size, territorial isolation and a common threat, whereas 
the Dayton agreement fulfils the conditions of a small population size, a balance of population size 
and territorial isolation. 
3.5 Conflict in Chiapas (Mexico) 
Chiapas as the poorest state in Mexico has an important indigenous community, while the white and 
mestizo elite controls land, politics and business (Womack, 1999). With few arable lands in the 
highlands where Indios live, with economic exploitation, attempts at acculturation and high birth 
rates, the situation for the indigenous population deteriorated. It led to important migration to 
remote jungle lowlands (Womack, 1999). With no development in those newly settled areas of the 
Lacandón,17 the Indio community set up its own structure, including armed militias (Weinberg, 
2000). In 1992 a land reform allowing landless communities to be granted land by the state was 
suppressed. The decrease of agricultural prices and North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
negotiations also threatened the poorest Indio farmers in Chiapas. In that context, the insurgency 
broke out (Womack, 1999). In early January 1994, 3’000 armed men and women of the Ejército 
Zapatista de Liberación Nacional18 (EZLN) surprisingly took several towns and villages in the 
highlands. The Mexican army used military force to defeat the insurgents. Yet, after massive popular 
pressures the government declared a ceasefire shortly after the insurgency started (Holloway & 
Peláez, 1998). 
Increasing popular support for the Zapatistas forced the Mexican government to start dialogue in the 
cathedral of San Cristóbal with the EZLN. However, after consulting civil society the EZLN rejected 
the settlement terms proposed by the government (Holloway & Peláez, 1998). Low intensity violence 
continued and the EZLN declared an autonomous region in Chiapas (Weinberg, 2000). After another 
military attempt to crush the rebellion in late 1994 (Stahler-Sholk, 2007), a new dialogue with the 
participation of civil society was started in San Andrés in March 1995 (Womack, 1999). The San 
Andrés agreement was signed in February 1996. This is the power-sharing peace agreement under 
consideration.  It   acknowledges  the   right  to  autonomy  and  self-government  for  Indio   people,  
 
______________________ 
17  See map appendix 3. 
18  Zapatista Army of National Liberation. 
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recognising indigenous rights and culture. It also provides for a new form of federalism in the 
Republic of Mexico. At the same time, it stipulates the participation of indigenous people in Chiapas’ 
political institutions, local councils and the administration (UCDP, 1996). 
This agreement has not been implemented and the EZLN boycotted the municipal elections in 1996 
(Stahler-Sholk, 2007). Thereafter the San Andrés agreement was officially ended in September 1996 
(Harbom et al, 2006). Thus, the peace agreement was not durable. Dialogue between the parties 
ended definitively, when the Mexican president Zedillo refused to pass the law on Indian rights. 
Low-level violence resumed in 1997 between paramilitaries, the police and the EZLN (Womack, 
1999). 
3.5.1 Favourable Conditions in Chiapas 
The central government has been involved in negotiations. However, the most important provisions 
in this accord concern the state of Chiapas. Hence, conditions are analysed for the state of Chiapas. 
The population of Chiapas was 3.8 million in 1997 (INEGI, 2007), a small population size. 
For the balance of population size between segmented groups, the indigenous language-speaking 
population of Chiapas older than 5 years in 2000 was 809’592 (INEGI, 2007). Hence, the total 
indigenous population group relevant in the conflict can be estimated at more than one million, even 
though the Indio people speak different indigenous languages (Womack, 1999). Chiapas is mainly 
populated by Mestizos and people of white descent who constitute together the economic and 
political elite (CIA, 2008; Womack, 1999). The mestizo and white population in Chiapas represents 
approximately 2.5 to 3 million (INEGI, 2007). Based on only two segmented population groups in 
conflict with one clear majority group, there cannot be a balance of population size. 
Regarding territorial isolation of segmented population groups, Chiapas is divided into more than 
100 municipalities (Weinberg, 2000). This study is not able to follow the operationalisation and 
provide group repartition for such a high number of administrative entities. However, Chiapas is 
divided into very distinct geographical zones,19 which reflect political and economic power and are 
the basis for the analysis (Womack, 1999). The central valley and the Western Sosconosco plains are 
the most fertile and prosperous zones. White rangers and Mestizos live in these areas, even though 
a limited number of Indio workers have settled there to work on plantations (Womack, 1999). Most 
Indios live in the highlands. In this indigenous heartland, ‘50 to 90 percent of people speak a Mayan 
language’ (Womack, 1999: 4). This is confirmed by official statistics for 2005 (INEG: 2007) which 
show that the indigenous-speaking population represents about 50% in the San Cristobal region and 
up to 100% in some surrounding villages. Mestizos are politically and economically dominant even 
in the highlands, but have not settled extensively because of poor soil and difficult climate (Womack, 
1999). The steep slopes of the Cañadas and the jungle lowland of the Lacandón have been settled 
by more than 200,000 indigenous people migrating from the highlands, but very few white and 
mestizo people (Weinberg, 2000). From the eastern jungle to the highlands, Indios form a clear 
majority, except in the city of San Cristóbal (Womack, 1999). Therefore, relying on this analysis one 
can conclude that a territorial isolation of divided groups exists. 
Regarding a common perceived threat, EZNL communiqués of subcomandante Marcos made clear 
that the main security threat for the Indio people are neo-liberal exploitation in general and the 
NAFTA agreement in particular. The authoritarian Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) 
governments of Chiapas and Mexico as broker of capitalism were seen as part of that threat. These 
developments are portrayed as threatening the very survival of the indigenous population 
(Weinberg, 2000; Stahler-Sholk, 2007).  On the  other hand, the mestizo and white group in Chiapas,  
 
______________________ 
19  Refer to map in appendix 3 for geographical names. 
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closely linked to the state-party PRI, is more interested in maintaining the liberal and corrupt system. 
The Zapatista insurgency has been seen as a major threat to state of Chiapas, the PRI and the liberal 
economy (Weinberg, 2000). Therefore, no common perceived threat exists. 
This peace agreement was not durable. It fulfils the two conditions of a small population size and 
territorial isolation. 
3.6 Chittagong Hill Tracts Conflict (Bangladesh) 
The Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) are located in south-eastern Bangladesh and are the only hilly 
region of the country. Conflict emerged in the 1970s, because of land alienation and the massive 
arrival of Bengali settlers. The CHT tribal population, collectively called Jumma, took up arms against 
the Bangladeshi government and Muslim Bengali settlers in the region in order to fight for autonomy 
(Islam, 1981; CHT Commission, 1991). The main political movement on the tribal side has been the 
Parbottya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samiti20 (JSS) and its armed wing the Shanti Bahini (CHT 
Commission, 1991). The massive Bangladeshi military reaction led to numerous abuses and 
atrocities, triggering important flows of refugees (Levene, 1999). In 1992, the end of military rule in 
Bangladesh facilitated a ceasefire and talks, despite continuing violence (CHT Commission, 1994). 
After the Awami-League electoral victory, peace negotiations led to a peace agreement signed with 
the JSS in December 1997 (Rashiduzzaman, 1998; CHT Commission, 1997; 2000). This is the case 
agreement. It grants autonomy to the region through the creation of the CHT Regional Council with 
competencies regarding administration, development programmes, tribal rules as well as law and 
order (CHT Commission, 2000). Executive power-sharing between tribal and non-tribal residents is 
established at the Regional Council level, as well as within the three District Councils.21 22 However, 
this peace accord triggered resistance from nationalist and Islamist parties in Bangladesh and settler 
movements, as well as Jumma groups such as the United Peoples’ Democratic Front and Shanti 
Bahini splinter groups asking for full independence (Rashiduzzaman, 1998; CHT Commission, 2000). 
According to the UCDP dataset (Harbom et al, 2006), the peace agreement has not been ended, nor 
has violence resurged between the same parties within five years. Even though the implementation 
of the agreement was temporarily delayed (CHT Commission, 2000), this power-sharing peace 
agreement has been durable. 
3.6.1 Favourable Conditions in the Chittagong Hill Tracts 
Since the power-sharing peace agreement concerns the CHT, conditions only relate to this region. 
The population size of the CHT in 1991 was 967’420 (CHT Commission, 1994). In 2000 with the 
repatriation of up to 70’000 tribal refugees from India (Levene 1999) the population is estimated at 
about 1.1 million (CHT Commission, 1994; 2000). The CHT therefore have a small population size. 
Regarding the balance of population size between segmented groups, the relevant and main 
segmental divide in conflict is between the Muslim Bengali settlers and the tribal Buddhist, Christian 
or Hindu Jummas (Islam, 1981; Levene, 1999). The tribal population is certainly subdivided into 
different groups, but the conflict has created a sense of Jumma identity, even though smaller tribes 
still  fear  to  some  extent  the  dominance  of  the  largest  Chakma  tribe  (Levene, 1999).  It can be  
 
______________________ 
20  The Chittagong Hill Tracts People Solidarity Association. 
21  The Regional Council is composed of a tribal chair, 12 tribal men (attributed proportionally to different tribes), 2 tribal 
women, 6 non-tribal men and one-tribal woman, all elected. In the Khagrachari, Rangamati and Bandarban districts, non-
tribal residents have to be represented by one-third of the council members (CHT commission 2000). 
22  Refer to CHT map, appendix 4. 
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reasonably assumed that the balance of population size is bipolar, in particular because the power-
sharing institutions are mainly concerned with the tribal and non-tribal population. Due to massive 
state-sponsored Bengali immigration between 1975 and 1985,23 the 1991 census indicates that 
468’825 residents of the CHT or 48.5 percent are Bengali settlers and 498’595 residents or 51.5 
percent Jumma people (CHT Commission, 1994). In 2000, the tribal population was estimated at 
600’000, the Bengali population at 500’000 (CHT Commission, 2000). Even though there is only a 
slight majority group, there is no balance of population size, because only two segmented groups 
compete. This conclusion is confirmed by the composition of the Regional Council in which tribal 
members clearly constitute the majority. 
Regarding territorial isolation of the two segmented population groups, the three districts are 
considered.24 The 1991 census indicates that in the Khagrachari district, Bengali settlers represent 52 
percent and in the Bandarban district 53 percent of the population. Tribal people represent a 57 
percent majority in the Rangamati district (CHT Commission, 1994). Hence, there is a certain 
geographical concentration of Jumma people in Rangamati, but the homogeneity/fragmentation 
figures for the three districts are very close to the figures for the whole CHT as outlined above. Thus, 
the CHT do not fulfil the condition of territorial isolation of segmented population groups. 
Regarding a common perceived threat, one has to analyse the background of the conflict. For the 
tribal people, the massive and rapid arrival of Bengali Muslim settlers, land occupation, forced 
displacement and destruction of traditional tribal agricultural land – for example through the hydro-
electrical Kaptai project – all constitute threats (CHT Commission, 1991; Lerche, 2008). The 
assimilative project of Muslim Bengali nation-building after the independence of Bangladesh in 
1971, the end of legal guarantees for tribal populations and the massive presence of ruthless 
Bangladeshi armed forces (Lerche, 2008, Levene, 1999) imply that Bangladesh and Bengali settlers 
are perceived as the main threat to Jummas’ economic, cultural, religious and physical survival (CHT 
Commission, 1991). On the other hand, the Bangladeshi government accuses the Jumma people to 
work ‘in the interests of a foreign power [India]’ (Levene, 1999: 340). Indeed, India is seen as a 
threatening hegemon by Bangladesh. The tribal insurgency itself is portrayed as a major threat to 
the sovereignty of a weak, politically unstable and underdeveloped Bangladesh (Levene, 1999; 
Rashiduzzaman, 1998). Hence, there is no perceived common threat for the 1997 CHT peace 
agreement. 
Thus, the CHT peace agreement has been durable between the two signatory parties. It fulfils only 
one favourable condition: a small population size. No other condition is fulfilled. 
3.7 Conflict in the Comoros 
The Comoros archipelago25 lies in the Indian Ocean, north of Madagascar. Since independence in 
1975, it has a history of economic crisis as well as political chaos with a total of seventeen 
attempted military coups (Africa Research Bulletin, 2001; Walker, 2007). As a former French colony, 
the state has been very centralised. In the context of socio-economic and demographic degradation, 
demonstrations took place in Anjouan in 1997. Soon they were spearheaded by the Anjouan 
secessionist movement, accusing the Comorian president of negligence towards Anjouan and of 
strengthening the position of his native Grande Comore (Walker, 2007). The secessionist state of 
Anjouan  was  proclaimed  in  August  1997  and  the  French  flag raised. Since neighbouring French 
 
______________________ 
23  In the late 1970s, tribal population still represented 90 percent of the CHT population (Islam, 1981). 
24  See map appendix 4. 
25  It is composed of the three islands of Grande Comore (Ngazidja), Anjouan (Ndzwani) and Mohéli (Mwali). Mayotte is also 
claimed by the Comoros, but still administered by France (Walker, 2007). See map appendix 5. 
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administered Mayotte was far more prosperous, Anjouan asked France for recolonisation, which 
Paris refused (Africa Research Bulletin, 1997c). Only two days later, the third island – Mohéli – also 
declared independence (Africa Research Bulletin, 1997c). The government tried to recapture Anjouan 
by military force, but completely failed. A popular referendum in Anjouan confirmed the 
independence of the island (Africa Research Bulletin, 1997a; 1997b). The conflict lasted throughout 
1998, despite the presence of military observers from the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) (Africa 
Research Bulletin, 1997b). The OAU Antananarivo peace initiative in 1999 failed, because Anjouan 
rejected the proposals. At the same time, concessions by the Comorian president Taki triggered a 
military coup by Colonel Azali after widespread anti-Anjouanese riots on Grande Comore (Africa 
Research Bulletin, 1999). After a failed attempt for reconciliation by the military ruler in 2000, the 
mediation efforts of the OAU led to the 2001 Fomboni agreement (Africa Research Bulletin, 2001) 
outlining a vague reconciliation process which stalled before legislative elections (Blanchy, 2004). 
In December 2003 the representatives of the three islands finally signed the Moroni framework 
agreement mediated by the African Union (AU). It is the case under consideration (Africa Research 
Bulletin, 2003). It confirms the autonomy of the islands within the Union of Comoros. It also 
requests the implementation of executive power-sharing institutions. These institutions include the 
elected Union presidency composed of a president and two vice-presidents, rotating between the 
islands, as well as power-sharing government. It settles controversial issues including the 
distribution of funds, legislative elections, as well as transitional powers of the Union and the 
autonomous islands regarding police and customs (AU, 2003). 
According to the UCDP, the agreement has not been ended. No violence has emerged between the 
signatories as of 2005 (Harbom et al, 2006). Therefore, the peace agreement is considered as 
durable. However, Colonel Bacar, who took part in the 1997 secessionist movement and was elected 
president of Anjouan in 2002 tried to get re-elected in 2007. These elections were considered illegal 
by the Union, but Bacar refused to step down. He accused the central government of continuing the 
discrimination against Anjouan (Africa Research Bulletin, 2008b) and threatened with secession (Al-
Watwan, 2007). AU troops supported by the Comorian army restored constitutional order in March 
2008 by taking Ajouan in a bloodless invasion to remove Bacar (Amir, 2008) despite limited armed 
resistance. President Bacar escaped to Mayotte and all secessionist flags were removed and replaced 
by Comorian flags (Africa Research Bulletin, 2008a). Throughout this period the peace agreement 
was not ended and established power-sharing institutions continued to work, since the Anjouanese 
population seemingly welcomed the invasion (Soilihi, 2008). Even though not falling within the 
chosen operationalisation of a durable peace agreement, this use of military force certainly 
questions to some extent the durability of this power-sharing peace agreement. At this stage, the 
analysis will address the favourable conditions in the Comoros. 
3.7.1 Favourable Conditions in the Comoros 
The 2003 peace agreement is a national peace agreement. Conditions are therefore analysed with 
reference to the whole country. In the 2003 census, the Comorian population was 575’660 (World 
Food Programme, 2006). Therefore, the population size is small. 
Regarding the balance of population size between segmented groups, one has to acknowledge that 
the Union of Comoros is culturally and ethnically homogenous (Walker, 2007), with 98 percent of 
Sunni Muslims (CIA, 2010). It has a common language, Shikomoro, even though each island has a 
different, but inter-comprehensible dialect (Walker, 2007). Nonetheless, politicians have 
exaggerated linguistic and cultural differences so that the island-specific identities constitute 
cleavages  relevant  to  the  conflict  based  on  small  differences  between  the islands  of Ngazidja,  
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Mwali.26 All three are taken into account since independent separatist moves have been registered 
on both smaller islands against the rule of Grande Comore. Moreover, the accord has been signed by 
representatives of the three islands. In the 2003 census, the population of Mohéli was 35’751 (6.2 
percent), that of Anjouan 243’732 (42.3 percent) and that of Grande Comore 296’177 (51,5 percent) 
(World Food Programme, 2006). An Anjouanese minority lives in Grande Comore (Walker, 2007; 
Africa Research Bulletin, 1999). Therefore, none of the three groups has a clear majority of over 50 
percent. As a result, a balance of population size between the three segmented groups exists. 
Regarding territorial isolation of segmented groups, this case is rather simple. Even though the 
population of the islands have been mixed over time to some extent (Walker, 2007), the islands of 
Mohéli and Anjouan are particularly homogeneous. Even though an Anjouanese minority lives on 
Grande Comore (Africa Research Bulletin, 1999), far more than the national percentages of 
Shingazidja-speaking people live on Grande Comore (Walker, 2007). Hence, one has to conclude 
that groups are territorially isolated. 
Coming to the common perceived threat, relations with the former colonial power France have to be 
considered. In particular, ‘the illegal occupation by France of this part [Mayotte] of our territory’27 
(Assembly of the Union, 2008: 2), but also the history of French involvement in Comorian affairs 
have affected the relations. Even though this French ‘occupation’ is presented as threat to the 
territorial integrity, France is a major aid donor and French legacy still vivid (Walker, 2007). 
Moreover, Anjouan asked for recolonisation in 1997 (Africa Research Bulletin, 1997c). Therefore, 
France certainly does not represent a common perceived security threat for all three segmented 
groups. Finally, it is important to mention that the major perceived threat to the Comorian nation, as 
depicted by representatives of Grande Comore, has been Anjouan’s secessionist aspirations (Amir, 
2008). One cannot speak of a common perceived threat in that regard. 
Thus, the 2003 peace agreement has been durable, with the limitation mentioned. This case fulfils 
the conditions of a small population size, a balance of population size and territorial isolation. 
3.8 Southern Sudan Conflict 
Since independence in 1956, Sudan has been affected by civil war. In the south, from 1955 to 1972 
as well as from 1983 to 2005 two civil wars were fought between the central government and 
southern Sudanese rebels.28 The causes of these wars are complex. Armed conflict took place in the 
context of the historic marginalisation of the periphery by the dominant northern Arab elite; 
economic and political inequality; regional dynamics; religious, cultural and ethnic differences 
between the centre and the periphery as well as militant Islamist policies by the government (Colins, 
2008; Deng, 1995; de Waal, 2007; Johnson, 2003). Different southern Sudanese armed groups have 
been fighting since 1983 for more autonomy or independence, but the dominant group is the Sudan 
Peoples’ Liberation Movement (SPLM) and its army (SPLA). New oil wealth also increased the sense 
of economic exploitation of the south by Khartoum (Martin, 2002). 
Another major development in the conflict was the 1991 breakaway of important SPLA commanders 
along ideological and ethnic lines, which led to an internal conflict between southern groups, some 
used as proxies by Khartoum (Young, 2003). The formed groups include the SPLA-United and the 
South  Ndzwani  and  Sudan Independence  Movement  (SSIM).  Other armed groups opposed to the  
 
______________________ 
26  These are the islands’ names referring to each local dialect: Grande Comore, Anjouan and Mohéli respectively (Walker, 
2007). See map appendix 5. 
27  Original text in French: ‘(…) l’occupation illégale de cette partie de notre territoire par la France’. 
28  See map of Sudan, appendix 6. 
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SPLA were created as well, including the Equatoria Defence Force and the South Sudan 
Independence Group (SSIG) (Arnold, 2007). The National Congress Party (NCP) government 
managed to isolate the SPLM by signing a peace agreement with these southern rebel splinter 
groups including the SPLA-United, the SSIM, the SSIG and the Equatoria Defence Force, regrouped in 
the United Democratic Salvation Front (UDSF) (El-Affendi, 2001, Young, 2003). This 1997 Khartoum 
peace agreement constitutes the first case study in Sudan (UCDP, 1997). It follows a governmental 
strategy of divide and rule, and is based on a patronage logic (Young, 2003). On paper the 
agreement fulfils many southern Sudanese demands, including the freedom of religion, the 
strengthening of state competences within a federal structure, the establishment of an autonomous 
Coordinating Council for the south, an independence referendum and executive power-sharing for 
southern Sudanese representatives within the presidency and the government in Khartoum (UCDP, 
1997). The armed groups were also merged into the South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF) which 
continued the armed conflict on the government side against the SPLA (Young, 2003). 
Different international peace initiatives were launched to address the continuing war in Sudan. Since 
1993 several actors, but in particular the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD)29 
was active in bringing the government and the SPLM to the negotiating table (El-Affendi, 2001). 
New strategies of the conflict parties in the changing international context after 9/11 allowed IGAD 
initiatives to progress, backed among others by the United States, the United Kingdom and Norway 
(Johnson, 2003; Young, 2003). Thereafter, the Machakos protocol was signed in July 2002. It 
established the principles for the peace process. The comprehensive negotiation process led to a 
series of protocols in 2003 and 2004 on specific issues between the government and the SPLM 
(Young, 2005). In 2005 the Comprehensive peace agreement (CPA) was signed between the 
government and the SPLM. It settles many contentious issues between the government and the 
SPLM, including security, power-sharing and wealth-sharing. It also foresees that South Sudan will 
vote on an independence referendum within six years (Security Council, 2005). In its power-sharing 
protocol, the agreement establishes executive power-sharing between the NCP government and the 
SPLM within the interim national government of Sudan and within the assembly. The interim 
presidency is allocated to the NCP, whereas the leader of the SPLM becomes first vice-president of 
Sudan and head of the government of South Sudan. Even after presidential elections, the power-
sharing structure would be maintained, since the president has to name two vice-presidents, one 
from the north and one from the south, with the role of first vice-president reserved for the region 
not occupying the presidency (Security Council, 2005). Moreover, the agreement guarantees 
executive power-sharing at the autonomous southern Sudan level and at the provincial state level 
(Security Council, 2005). It also provides for extensive autonomy in South Sudan and extends the 
competences of the provincial states within the federal structure (Security Council, 2005). 
The 1997 Khartoum agreement faced major setbacks. The SPLA-United commander defected to the 
SPLA in 1998. The accord was definitively ended in January 2000, when Riek Machar – head of the 
SSIM – resigned from the power-sharing government in Khartoum, because the agreement was not 
implemented (Harbom et al, 2006). Hence, this agreement has not been durable. 
On the other hand, the CPA between the government and the SPLM has not been ended so far. 
UCDP data on armed violence is not available after 2005. Based on the available information, it is 
generally acknowledged that the conflict has not restarted between the same conflict parties, 
despite limited local violence in southern Sudan (Weber, 2010). Hence, one can assume that this 
peace  agreement   has  been   durable.  Nonetheless,  the exclusionary  character  of  power-sharing  
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29  The IGAD is a regional organisation including Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, Djibouti, Sudan and Somalia. 
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between the NCP and the SPLM has prompted armed resistance by the SSDF, but also by Darfur 
rebels who massively increased armed insurgency in response to the peace process (de Waal, 2007; 
Idris, 2005; Young, 2005). Many have warned about the potential for an outbreak of renewed 
violence in the south and even the break-up of Sudan (Weber, 2010; de Waal, 2007; Young, 2005). 
3.8.1 Favourable Conditions in Sudan 
Favourable conditions are particularly difficult to analyse in Sudan, because the ethnic and political 
reality is extremely complex. The scarcity of accurate demographic data is also a challenge. Another 
issue is that two different armed groups claiming to represent southern Sudan have signed the two 
case accords. Yet, most conditions apply to the two cases which mainly relate to the central 
government and therefore to the whole of Sudan. In the controversial 2008 census upon which 
constituencies for the recent elections were based, the population of Sudan was established at 39 
million (CBS, 2008; Gustafson, 2010). Thus, it is clear that the population size is big, even though 
some groups were excluded by the agreements. 
Regarding the balance of population size between segmented groups another problem emerges. 
Many scholars reject the explanation of deeply rooted ethnic hatred between the Arab Muslim north 
and the African animist or Christian south (Branch & Mampilly, 2005; de Waal, 2007; Young, 2005). 
The south itself is divided into rival ethnic groups, even though a southern self-perception and a 
politicised identity have developed in the south based on the common resistance to the Arab threat 
(Deng, 1995; Idris, 2005). The 1997 peace agreement expressly stipulates that southern Sudan – as a 
region – is sharing power. For the CPA, the SPLM clearly claims to represent the whole population of 
southern Sudan, which is guaranteed to participate in the power-sharing institutions regardless of 
SPLM election results. Moreover, in recent elections, the SPLM won 93 percent of votes for the 
presidency of the Government of South Sudan (BBC News: 2010). Therefore, one can speak about a 
southern Sudanese group. The 2008 census figures indicate a population in southern Sudan of 7.2 
million or about 19% of the total population (CBS, 2008), even though this does not include the 
southern refugees living in Khartoum (OCHA, 2006). 
The second segmented group, the Arab Muslim north which the NCP claims to represent, is even 
more problematic to delimit. Given the armed conflicts in Darfur and the east, which have been 
essential parts of the conflict dynamics between the centre and the periphery in Sudan (Johnson, 
2003; de Waal, 2007), those regions can certainly not be included in the northern group. If taking off 
the population of 4.5 million in the 3 eastern states, 7.5 million in Darfur as well as the 
approximately 1-2 million living in the contested boundary region of Abyei, Nuba Mountains and 
Blue Nile State (CBS, 2008), the northern group is not bigger the 18 million, which is less than 50% 
of the total population in Sudan (CBS, 2008). This regional reasoning does certainly not fully 
correspond to the complex reality on the ground and does not completely match the proposed 
operationalisation. Yet, it is sufficient to conclude that two population groups, represented by two 
political parties, are sharing national power and at the same time are excluding population groups 
relevant to conflict in Sudan. Logical reasoning implies that this situation cannot represent a balance 
of population size not even between the two represented divided groups. Hence, there is no balance 
of population size in the sense of a favourable condition for the two cases in Sudan. 
Regarding territorial isolation of segmented population groups, it is too complicated to follow the 
proposed operationalisation and analyse population figures for every administrative subdivision in 
Sudan. Nevertheless, some useful information can be found in the literature. Southern Sudan is 
mostly populated by African Christian or animist people. This group does not live in the northern 
states, except southern refugees living in Khartoum (Deng, 1995; Martin, 2002; OCHA, 2006). Even 
though the conflict is also about unequal development and political marginalisation, the people of 
southern Sudan are still territorially isolated from the centre, despite the fact that the border 
between north and south is a contested issue. On the other hand, the dominant northern Arab 
population is living in the northern states and Khartoum (Idris, 2005). Therefore, one may assume 
that the two represented groups in the two peace agreements are geographically isolated. 
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Regarding a common perceived threat, the agreements have to be analysed separately. For the 1997 
agreement, the signatory splinter rebel groups were dominated by the Nuer and Equatorian ethnic 
groups and perceived a direct military threat from the SPLA in the south-south conflict despite 
claiming to represent the whole of southern Sudan. Moreover, they feared to some extent 
‘Dinkanisation’ (Arnold, 2007: 503), because the SPLM is dominated by Dinkas, the main ethnic 
group in the south (Young, 2003), although the splinter groups also perceived the Arab north as a 
threat (Young, 2003). The SPLA armed insurgency has been the major security threat for the 
Sudanese government. Even though it is difficult to assess the main perceived threat accurately, 
ironically the powerful SPLM/A seems to have been a common perceived security threat for the 
government and splinter groups until the 1997 peace agreement broke down (El-Affendi, 2001). 
Regarding the 2005 agreement, the government of Sudan has had strained relations with 
neighbouring countries including Eritrea, Ethiopia and Uganda. These states have at some point 
financed southern Sudanese armed insurgents. The SPLM/SPLA in particular has benefited from 
variable support from Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda and the United States opposed to the Islamist 
regime in Khartoum (de Waal, 2007; Young, 2005). On the other hand, the major perceived threat as 
depicted by the SPLM to southern Sudanese’s cultural and religious survival is Arab assimilationism 
and Islamist expansionism (Johnson, 2003). The Arab north from the time of slavery to the Islamist 
government of al-Bashir is portrayed as the main enemy. Southern splinter groups are no military 
threat to the powerful SPLA (Deng, 1995; El-Affendi, 2001). Hence, for the CPA between the 
government and the SPLM, there is no common perceived threat. 
In brief, the 1997 Khartoum agreement has not been durable. It fulfils the conditions of territorial 
isolation and a common perceived threat. The 2005 agreement has been durable. This case only 
fulfils the condition of territorial isolation. No other condition is fulfilled. 
The following discussions will take into account that some case studies could not strictly follow the 
proposed operationalisations and that conditions as well as the outcome variable are at times 
unclear. 
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4 Discussion of Results 
Based on the case studies above, a table is compiled summarising all favourable conditions for each 
power-sharing peace agreement. This chapter aims to discuss the potential favourable effect of the 
four conditions on the durability of power-sharing peace agreements. The discussions focus on each 
condition separately: first the population size, then the balance of population size between 
segmented groups, territorial isolation of segmented groups and a common perceived security 
threat. Some explanatory examples from the case studies are given in order to demonstrate potential 
favourable or unfavourable effects of conditions. The second part of this chapter analyses effects of 
the total number of conditions fulfilled. Finally, case study evidence is used to identify other 
important context factors. 
The discussion of the conditions has to start with the fact that out of the eight power-sharing peace 
agreements none has seen violence resurge between the signatory parties within five years. The 
peace agreement in Chiapas and the 1997 Khartoum agreement have been ended. Moreover, the 
case agreement in the Comoros has been affected by the events of March 2008, even though they 
did not end the power-sharing accord. Therefore, only two peace agreements have formally not been 
durable between the signatories. As a result, there is limited variation on the outcome variable. 
Table summarising favourable conditions 
Agreement Population 
size 
Balance of 
population 
size 
Territorial 
isolation of 
groups 
Common 
perceived 
threat 
Total of 
conditions 
Durable  
peace 
BAC agreement, 
1993, Bodoland 
Small Yes No No 2 Yes 
Washington 
agreement, 1994, 
Federation of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 
Small No Yes Yes 3 Yes 
Dayton agreement, 
1995, Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
Small Yes Yes No 3 Yes 
San Andrés 
agreement, 1996, 
Chiapas 
Small No Yes No 2 No, ended in 
1996 
CHT peace 
agreement, 1997, 
Chittagong Hill 
Tracts 
Small No No No 1 Yes 
Framework 
agreement, 2003, 
Comoros 
Small Yes Yes No 3 Yes 
Khartoum 
agreement, 1997, 
Sudan 
Big No Yes Yes 2 No, ended in 
2000 
Comprehensive 
peace agreement, 
2005, Sudan 
Big No Yes No 1 Yes 
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4.1 Testing the Favourable Conditions Separately 
All the power-sharing peace agreements have been signed in countries or regions with a small 
population size except the two cases in Sudan. The 2005 CPA has been durable so far in Sudan, a 
country classified as big. Could one then conclude that a small population size, a contrario, is not a 
favourable condition? Having only one case of a big country which on top of it is characterised by 
highly complex regional and national dynamics implies that it is methodologically inadequate to 
make such a conclusion. The five other durable case agreements not including the agreement in 
Sudan have been signed in a country/region with a small population size. The ended San Andrés 
agreement in Chiapas potentially benefited from two favourable conditions, including a small 
population size. In this case, the small population size could not make the agreement more durable, 
since it failed after only a few months. It is indeed unclear how a structural small population size 
could save power-sharing peace agreements in the short term (Papparlardo, 1981). Only in the long 
term could the small population size potentially favour durability. In general, there is neither 
methodologically sufficient variation nor clear-cut evidence from the case studies to confirm the 
favourable effect of a small population size. 
Regarding the balance of population size between segmented groups, the ended peace agreement in 
Chiapas and the 1997 Khartoum agreement could not benefit from this favourable condition. This 
provides some evidence in favour of the condition. Nevertheless, neither the Chittagong Hill Tracts 
agreement nor the Washington agreement could benefit from that condition. Only three durable 
accords in three states or regions fulfilled the balance of population size condition. Nonetheless, the 
Croat-Bosniak Federation provides some evidence that this favourable condition matters. Indeed, the 
demographic size of divided groups is not in balance in the Federation. The refusal by the Bosnian 
Croats to be closely allied to the Bosniaks during different stages of the war is often explained by 
the fear of being dominated by the Bosniak majority (Kumar, 1997). Hence, a balance has been 
created in politics, since Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks have exactly the same political power under 
the Washington agreement regarding the executive presidency and the assembly (UCDP, 1994). 
Attempts to change electoral rules in 2000 and 2001, which would have affected this political 
balance between segmented groups within the Federation, were strongly opposed by Bosnian Croats 
threatening even with secession (Belloni, 2004). This example indicates that the balance of 
population size between divided groups matters for the durability of power-sharing peace 
agreements. Evidence can also be found in the Comoros. Walker (2007) argues that the peace 
agreement only restored a fragile historic balance between the islands that has been destroyed 
before and during the conflict. Both cases point in the same direction: when the size of segmented 
population groups are such that a political balance is likely, the condition might be considered as 
favourable for the durability of a power-sharing peace agreement. Even if this conclusion is not 
clearly supported by the case studies, some empirical evidence is consistent with the favourable 
effect of the balance of population size between segmented groups. 
Regarding territorial isolation between segmented groups, only the agreements in Bodoland and the 
Chittagong Hill Tracts do not fulfil this condition. Both regions have witnessed a massive influx of 
immigrants into tribal areas. It seems that the intermingling of divided communities, even though a 
cause of conflict, has not affected the durability of the peace agreements in particular in the CHT 
(CHT Commission, 2000). These cases question the favourable quality of the condition. On the other 
hand, all other six power-sharing peace agreements fulfil the condition of territorial group isolation, 
including the ended agreement in Chiapas. This may again be evidence against the favourable 
character of territorial isolation. Moreover, in the Comoros territorial isolation is most clear-cut, 
because of physical separation by sea between the islands. If one considers the March 2008 
invasion, such clear territorial isolation of divided groups can be interpreted as a hindrance to the 
durability of power-sharing peace agreements. President Bacar of Anjouan could easily threaten with 
secession after the row about presidential elections in Anjouan because of the territorial isolation. 
Therefore,  the  physical  isolation  between  groups  has  not  been  favourable.  It could in fact even  
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favour partition (Kaufmann, 1996). Based on this analysis, case study evidence is rather inconsistent 
with the favourable effect of territorial isolation between segmented groups. 
Coming to the last condition of a common perceived threat, it is noteworthy that in internal armed 
conflicts the warring opponents often perceive each other as the main security threat (Spears, 2002). 
As predicted by Papparlardo (1981), this condition is European-centric, because it is induced from a 
very specific European situation during and after the two World Wars. However, two out of the eight 
power-sharing agreements benefited from this condition: the Washington agreement between 
Croats and Bosniaks and the 1997 Khartoum agreement. These cases show that this condition is still 
relevant in the contemporary world, even though few peace agreements will benefit from it. 
Regarding the favourable effects of the condition, one should analyse the Washington agreement. 
After heavy military clashes between Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks as well as major population 
displacements, the 1994 Washington agreement was durable particularly because both groups were 
threatened by Bosnian Serb nationalism and military offensives until 1995 (Kumar, 1997). At that 
time, there was no meaningful international presence in the Federation, which could have enforced 
the peace agreement. For the unlikely 1997 power-sharing peace agreement between the southern 
Sudanese splinter groups and the government in Khartoum, the role of the common perceived threat 
is less clear, despite the fact that both signatories perceived the SPLA as a common security threat 
(Young, 2003). Even though this favourable condition only applies to two agreements, evidence 
from Bosnia-Herzegovina in particular tends to be consistent with the favourable effect of a common 
perceived threat, although this factor might not be sufficient to sustain a power-sharing peace 
agreement over the long term. 
In the next part the cumulative effect of favourable conditions is analysed, which is central to 
confirm or reject conclusions for separate conditions as discussed above. 
4.2 Testing the Cumulative Effect of Favourable Conditions 
This working paper considers the total of favourable conditions fulfilled for each case agreement. 
The summarising table has shown that two power-sharing peace agreements only fulfil one 
favourable condition, three agreements were signed in the context of two favourable conditions and 
three other accords fulfil three conditions. No agreement fulfils zero or four conditions. Can evidence 
be found regarding the positive effect of a high number of favourable conditions on the durability of 
power-sharing peace agreements? In fact no pattern between favourable conditions and the 
durability of peace agreements is observable. Some particularly relevant cases are used as evidence. 
The Chittagong Hill Tracts agreement with only one favourable condition was a durable peace 
agreement. Indeed, this conflict has been largely settled despite limited violence by splinter groups 
(CHT Commission, 2000). The Chiapas agreement was ended in the context of two favourable 
conditions, whereas the durable 2005 Comprehensive peace agreement in Sudan fulfils only one 
condition. If this agreement survives the 2011 independence referendum, it will constitute further 
evidence against the cumulative effect of favourable conditions. The accord in the Comoros 
benefited from three favourable conditions out of four. Yet, the March 2008 military operation 
questions at least the cumulative favourable effect. All this evidence is inconsistent with the 
cumulative effect of favourable conditions. The Dayton peace agreement in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 
the context of three favourable conditions has been durable. At the same time this case is rather 
particular due to the very strong international presence as will be developed below. Based on the 
evaluation above, it seems rather doubtful that the number of favourable conditions affects the 
durability of power-sharing peace agreements. In brief, there is little evidence from the case studies 
that agreements are more likely to be durable if many of the four favourable conditions are fulfilled. 
This last finding casts doubts on the very favourable character of separately analysed conditions. 
Indeed, if separate conditions are favourable at least to some extent, they should logically also have 
cumulative effects. 
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4.3 What Else Does Case Study Evidence Tell Us? 
Based on the case study evidence this paper identifies a number of other context factors as 
established in the literature which could be taken into account in regard to the durability of power-
sharing peace agreements. This is an expansion of the research question, which might be particularly 
relevant for practice and further research. The politico-military context, including international 
presence and involvement (Bose, 2005; Doyle & Sambanis, 2000, Walter, 1997; 1999) as well as the 
existence of splinter or other armed groups not party to a power-sharing peace agreement 
(Stedman, 1997; 2002; Tull & Mehler, 2005), is identified as particularly relevant based on the case 
study evidence. 
First, the international presence or third party involvement is probably a context factor, which is very 
relevant to think about. It is commonly acknowledged that the Dayton peace agreement in Bosnia-
Herzegovina has been so durable because of the massive international NATO, OSCE and EU presence 
(Bose, 2005; Chandler, 2000). The international High Representative for Bosnia-Herzegovina is the 
highest instance to oversee the Dayton peace agreement and, therefore, has important prerogatives. 
He can for example remove public officials or impose laws if the power-sharing bodies are blocked 
(OHR, 2010). Bosnia clearly seems to indicate that strong international involvement even though 
often contested and criticised (Belloni, 2004; Bose, 2005; Chandler, 2000) is one very important 
option (Papagianni, 2008) in order to ensure the durability of power-sharing peace agreements. As 
context factor it most probably plays an important role. This conclusion is consistent with the case in 
the Comoros. The African Union supported by Comorian troops launched a military operation in 
March 2008 in order to topple Anjouan’s president Bacar after he held illegal elections. The stated 
aim was to end the secessionist aspirations so that the threatened power-sharing peace agreement 
could be maintained. Without consequent AU involvement this could not have been possible (Al-
Watwan, 2007; Alfeine, 2008; ARB, 2008a; ARB, 2008b). This example shows again the importance 
of international involvement to make power-sharing peace agreements more durable. At the same 
time, in other durable agreements such as in the CHT no international involvement has been 
registered at all. International involvement therefore seems important but not necessary. 
The politico-military context relevant for durable power-sharing peace agreements and of particular 
importance for practitioners also includes the presence or absence of armed rebel groups not party 
to the agreement as well as splinter groups (Stedman, 1997). New armed groups may also be 
created as a response to power-sharing peace agreements (Tull & Mehler, 2005). Indeed, the signing 
of a power-sharing peace agreement often does not imply stable peace and may even trigger other 
conflicts. In Sudan, for example, the flare-up of conflict in Darfur is also explained by the exclusion of 
Darfur rebel groups of the central power-sharing institutions created by the CPA. The 1997 
Khartoum agreement also fuelled conflict in the south between the SSDF and the SPLA (Colins, 2008; 
de Waal, 2007; Idris, 2005). Other case studies are also characterised by armed splinter groups. In 
Bodoland more radical armed groups such as the National Democratic Front of Bodoland, not party 
to the 1993 agreement, as well as the newly created Bodoland Liberation Tiger Forces continued the 
armed struggle for full independence after the agreement was signed between the ABSU, the Bodo 
People’s Action Committee and the government of Assam. Local conditions have been far from 
peaceful even though the particular power-sharing peace agreement was classified as durable 
(Dasgupta, 1997; Bhaumik, 2000). To a limited extent the Chittagong Hill Tracts case, where splinter 
groups continued sporadic armed struggle after the power-sharing peace agreement was signed, is 
also consistent with the importance of the role of armed groups not party to the accord 
(Rashiduzzaman, 1998; CHT Commission, 2000). This context factor is particularly relevant to look at 
for practitioners and academics. Power-sharing peace agreements indeed have an exclusionary 
character, which may trigger further armed violence. This complex interplay between power-sharing 
peace agreements and insurgency by other armed groups is an important aspect to be considered in 
future research. 
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In brief, based on case study evidence the politico-military context, in particular international 
involvement as well as the presence or absence of other armed insurgent groups have been 
identified as relevant context factors which may affect the durability of power-sharing peace 
agreements. 
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5 Conclusion 
5.1 Summary of Findings 
Lijphart’s favourable conditions have never been tested in the particular context of power-sharing 
peace agreements. This paper provides empirical evidence regarding those favourable conditions 
and contributes to the debate on favourable conditions. Eight case studies were carried out in order 
to provide evidence on the four selected favourable conditions of a small population size, a balance 
of population size between segmented groups, territorial isolation of segmented population groups 
and a common perceived security threat. The testing of these conditions was challenging due to the 
lack of accurate data in order to follow the proposed operationalisation and limited variation in the 
outcome variable (durability of power-sharing peace agreements). Only two out of eight agreements 
have not been durable. This is certainly a limitation to the analysis, but is compensated by the great 
diversity of cases. At the same time the finding that some power-sharing peace agreements have 
been durable is a rebuttal of those authors arguing that power-sharing is not a workable model in 
practice. Evidence from a great diversity of cases ranging from the Chittagong Hill Tracts to Sudan 
show that power-sharing can be established and is not doomed to fail. 
The potentially favourable effect of Lijphart’s four conditions on the durability of power-sharing 
peace agreements was tested. As predicted by critics (Bogaards, 1998; Papparlardo, 1981), case 
study evidence is rather inconsistent with the favourable character of Lijphart’s conditions. The 
evidence for the effect of a balance of population size between segmented groups and of a small 
population size on the durability of power-sharing peace agreements was inconclusive. Territorial 
isolation of segmented groups does not seem to have a favourable effect. Finally, discussions 
highlighted some evidence showing the favourable effect of a common perceived security threat at 
least in the short term. The main finding of this working paper, however, is that no cumulative effect 
of the four favourable conditions is mirrored in empirical evidence. This finding casts serious doubts 
on the favourable nature of separate conditions as well. Any favourable effect of the four separate 
conditions is therefore limited at most. This finding implies that the durability of power-sharing 
peace agreements does not depend upon a particular structural favourable context as developed by 
Lijphart based on European examples. As a result, the importance of (un)favourable structural 
conditions for power-sharing peace agreements should not be overstated. Nevertheless, the politico-
military context as identified in this working paper may play an important role for the durability of 
power-sharing peace agreements. This has important practical implications. 
5.2 Practical Implications 
The finding that the durability of power-sharing peace agreements is probably not dependent on 
Lijphart’s four favourable conditions has important practical implications. It implies that power-
sharing institutions in peace agreements are probably not dependent upon specific structural 
conditions as existing in European cases. Critics arguing that power-sharing institutions can only 
work in Western democracies, such as Switzerland, therefore seem to be wrong. Political institution 
engineers, mediators and consultants cannot dismiss or reject power-sharing institutions just 
because a country context does not seem to be favourable or ‘European‘ enough. Power-sharing 
arrangements in peace agreements can potentially be durable regardless of the structural context, as 
confirmed by evidence provided in this working paper. 
For the idea that political institutions can be engineered in divided societies affected by armed 
conflict, the durability of peace agreements is probably the most serious test. However, the findings 
and practical implications put forward in this working paper do not imply that Lijphart’s model 
should be applied rigidly and used as a single one-size-fits-all model. Neither do they suggest that 
power-sharing   solutions   should  be  introduced   in  every   peace   agreement.   One   should   not  
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overemphasise the possibility to manage armed conflicts between divided groups through power-
sharing mechanisms. Power-sharing is no panacea to end armed conflicts. Yet, power-sharing should 
be considered as valuable option when negotiating and drafting peace agreements, since they are 
not doomed to fail and may work even outside a favourable European context. 
Efforts to develop general guidelines for a range of power-sharing mechanisms in peace agreements 
need to be intensified. Indeed, the quality of engineered power-sharing arrangements adapted to 
the local conflict reality matters most – not favourable or unfavourable structural conditions. 
Therefore, this working paper prepares the ground for guidelines on various forms of power-sharing 
solutions. Amongst the specific conflict reality, the presence or absence of armed groups not party to 
the accord and the willingness of international actors to get involved have been identified in this 
paper. These changing politico-military context factors should be taken into account when thinking 
about power-sharing solutions to resolve armed conflict. 
As a step forward, future guidelines should consider all major critiques of power-sharing and 
consider what measures or adaptations could be found to avoid adverse effects. Recent work 
(Papagianni, 2007; 2008; Töpperwien, 2010) as described in this paper has already shown that 
power-sharing clauses in peace agreements should only apply to a transitional period, whereas a 
more participative decision-making process including a larger number of constituencies should 
decide on the long-term political institutions. Yet, many other challenges and obstacles related to 
power-sharing institutions have to be overcome. A particularly arduous one will be to avoid power-
sharing agreements setting a bad example (Tull & Mehler, 2005). What can practitioners do, how 
might power-sharing mechanisms look like so they will not motivate other actors to take up arms in 
order to get their share of power? This relates to the major problem of splinter and other armed 
groups not party to power-sharing peace agreements. Guidelines on political power-sharing should 
therefore certainly take on board those issues in order to become useful working tools. 
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Appendix 3: Map of Chiapas (Mexico) 
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Appendix 4: Map of the Chittagong Hill Tracts (Bangladesh) 
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Appendix 5: Map of the Comoros 
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